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Contingent Liabilities From Capital Transactions-
Is Payment Capital or Ordinary Loss?
FRANCIS E. COAD*
Introduction: The subject of this article is the problem of
whether payment of a contingent liability arising from a prior
transaction on which capital gain or loss was realized, should be
treated as capital or ordinary loss in the year of payment. This
problem arises where a contingent liability was assumed in the
earlier transaction, or transferee or other liability across there-
from as a matter of law. The taxpayer may have realized gain
or loss from assets sold or exchanged, or from the liquidation of
a corporation.
For the purpose of this discussion we are assuming that the
recent Switlik case' in the Third Circuit is right in holding that
the payment of the contingent liability can be treated as loss only
in the year of payment, and cannot be used to adjust the earlier
capital transaction and get a tax refund, though there is conflict
of authority on this point. The Switlik case held that such a
rule, used by the Supreme Court as to ordinary gain or loss trans-
actions,2 applied equally to contingent liabilities arising out of
earlier capital transactions.!
Assuming then that the loss from payment of the contingent
liability is realized only in the year of payment, is it a capital
loss or an ordinary loss?
The Switlik Case (1950): In the Suntlik case the Tax Court
and the Third Circuit both held that such a loss is an ordinary
loss.' This case clearly presents our specific problem.
*Associate professor of law at Montana State University until his recent
death in September, 1952.
'Com'r v. Switlik, 184 F(2d) 299, 50-2 USTC #9446 (1950), aff'g 13 T.C.
121.
'U.S. v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951), and Security Flour Mills v. Com.,
321 U.S. 281 (1944), following dictum in North American Oil Consol. v.
Burnett, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).8I.R.C. § 23 (e) as to individuals and § 23(f) as to corporations allow de-
ductions only of "losses sustained during the taxable year," applying
to both capital and ordinary losses, make this conclusion difficult to
avoid.
'Com'r v. Switlik, 184 F(2d) 299, 50-2 USTC #9446 (3d Cir., 1950),
aff'g 13 T.C. 121. Accord, Bauer, 15 T.C. 876 (1950), and Milliken, 15
T.C. 243 (1950). Com'r acquiesced in Bauer and Milliken as to year of
realization, but non-acquiesced as to classification as capital loss, 1951-8-
13570, p. 1; CCH (1951) para. 6113.
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Taxpayers received proceeds of liquidation of a corporation
in 1941. In 1944 they had to pay deficiencies in the corporation's
taxes because of transferee liability. They deducted these pay-
ments as ordinary loss in 1944. The Commissioner contended
that these losses took their character from the original transac-
tion, and should be treated as capital losses. The tax Court over-
ruled the commissioner, holding this was not a loss realized by
sale or exchange requiring capital loss treatment, and therefore
should be deducted as an ordinary loss on a transaction entered
into for profit. The Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, said the
Tax Court got this result by "adhering to the principle of the
tax year" and affirmed. On this appeal the Commissioner relied
to a large extent on the Benedict case' just decided, and from it
argued that since only half the gain to taxpayer was recognized
originally, the whole loss could not be allowed in 1944 as that
would be charging the whole to that part of the gain taken into
account in 1941. The Court of Appeals distinguished the Bene-
diet case on the ground that it only involved a single tax year.
The Dobson Case (1943-4)." The Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, in the Dobson case, argued that a tax realization was
a closed transaction and subsequent realizations must be classi-
fied without regard to it. The Supreme Court overruled the
Eighth Circuit as to the "tax benefit rule" adopted by the Tax
Court, and on the rehearing opinion it affirmed the Tax Court
holding that recoveries to the extent that a tax benefit had been
received on earlier losses, would be ordinary rather than capital
gain, saying:
"The Tax Court did not find as a matter of fact,
and we decline to say as a matter of law, that such a
transaction is a 'sale or exchange' of a capital asset in
the accepted meaning of those terms."
This statement cannot be construed as approval of the Court of
Appeals' basic theory, for the tax benefit rule itself runs contra
to it.
The Supreme Court's opinion cannot be given much weight
on our specific problem for two reasons. First, it was using the
short-lived "Dobson rule" of review of Tax Court cases, and its
approval meant only that rules of law adopted by the Tax Court
did not clearly violate any statute or regulation having the force
of statute. The Tax Court would not be prevented from chang-
r'U.S. v. Benedict, 338 U.S. 692 (1950).
'Dobson v. Com'r, 46 B.T.A. 765, 770 (1942) ; rev'd in 133 F(2d) 732,
42-1 USTC #9332 (1943) ; T.C. aff. U.S. 489 (1943), rehearing 321 U.S.
231 (1944).
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ing its own rule by such a holding. Second, the facts were much
different from those of our problem. In the Dobson case, tax-
payer, after selling some stock, discovered that he had been de-
frauded on his original purchase some years before, and re-
covered damages. This was held to be ordinary gain in the year
of recovery. It could hardly be said to have arisen from any
earlier "sale or exchange" by the taxpayer of a capital asset.
The Supreme Court cannot be said to have approved the statu-
tory construction adopted in the Switlik case by this holding.
Duveen Bros. Case (1951):' This case is directly contra to
Switlik in theory, though it distinguishes Switlik on the facts.
Here T took an ordinary deduction under § 23(f) of amounts
he was required to pay in the tax year under a contingent liability
expressly assumed on the sale of stock in an earlier year. T had
reported a capital gain at the time of such sale. The Tax Court
upheld the Commissioner's ruling that T was only entitled to a
capital loss deduction, saying:
"In our opinion, the refunds of parts of the pur-
chase price paid for the stock are unquestionably part
of the general transaction involving sales of capital as-
sets. The refunds to the purchasers of the stock repre-
sent a loss to the petitioner. Since the loss was sus-
tained in connection with the sale of stock, it is a capital
loss."
The court distinguishes the Switlik case on the facts, reciting its
facts at some length and saying that they differ, but not why,
except possibly that there is a distinction between transferee lia-
bility imposed by law and the liability expressly assumed here.
The court said:
"This Court and the Court of Appeals held, under
the facts, that the'loss sustained upon the payment of
the tax deficiencies, which grew out of transferee lia-
bility, was not part of 'a sale or exchange' of capital as-
sets.
"The situation in this case is not analogous....
Perhaps more significant is language putting the blame for Swit-
lik on the Commissioner:
"The Commissioner conceded, in the Switlik case,
that the later payments of the corporation's tax defi-
ciencies, in 1944, did not represent losses from 'the sale
or exchange' of capital assets."
Four judges dissented arguing that the subsequent payment
'Duveen Bros., 17 T.C ....... #15 (1951).
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on the guarantee was "not loss occasioned by the sale or exchange
of any capital asset;" that, while related to prior sales, it was
not "from sales or exchanges of capital assets" under § 117(a).
This is essentially the Switlik theory.
Can Switlik and Duveen Bros. Be Distinguished?: Aside
from the fact that the Commissioner in Switlik conceded that the
payments were not losses from sale or exchange of capital assets,
which is the basic question in classifying the loss as capital loss
under § 117(a), there seems to be no essential difference in the
two cases. In the one case the contingent liability arose by law
while in the other it was expressly assumed. It may be that a
line should be drawn as to more remote liabilities having some
connection with a capital realization, but transferee liability,
whether expressly assumed or not, hardly seems so remote. The
two cases proceed on opposite theories of interpretation of
§ 117(a), the statute defining capital gains and losses, and it
does not appear that they should be reconciled on the basis of
such an elusive distinction of fact.'
Conflicting Theories: The two conflicting theories repre-
sented by the Switlik and Duveen Bros. cases might be summed
up as follows:
Swvitlik: The statutes give capital gain or loss treatment
only to sales or exchanges of capital assets. Only gains or losses
realized by sale or exchange are entitled to such treatment. Under
the tax year concept the gain or loss must be realized by sale or
exchange in the tax year. The consequence is that a capital sale
or exchange is a closed transaction, and contingent liabilities aris-
ing therefrom must be treated as an ordinary loss when realized
by payment.
Duveen Bros.: Capital treatment should be given gains or
losses which are part of a general transaction involving sales of
capital assets. A loss sustained "in connection with" a sale of
capital assets is a capital loss.
This conflict centers around differing interpretations of
§ 117(a), defining capital gains and losses.
Statutes: The idea of an inherent distinction between capital
OIt should be noted here that the Tax Court In 1944 in the Koppers case,
3 T.C. 62, held T entitled only to capital loss deductions for payments
on both transferee liability imposed by law (Bexley and Falmouth trans-
actions) and on sale of stock (Koppers Kokomo transaction), where ex-
pressly assumed.
See also as overruling an argument for a distinction based on whether
T was aware of the liability at the time of the capital realization:
Roberta Pittman, 14 T.C. 449 (1950).
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transactions and those giving rise to ordinary gain or loss keeps
arising in the cases, but there is no basis for it in the code.
The capital gain and loss provisions of the code have just
sort of grown by amendment after amendment. When sale of
capital assets was held to create taxable income under the broad
provisions of the income tax statute taxing income "from any
source whatever," statutes were added to give special treatment
to gains or losses "from sale or exchange" of capital assets. From
time to time special statutes have added other transactions to be
treated as "sales or exchanges" and hence get this capital gain
and loss treatment. The basic definition of a capital gain or loss
remains one "from the sale or exchange" of capital assets.'
At first glance it seems logical to say that "from the sale
or exchange" means "realized from" and hence these statutes
mean that the gain or loss must be realized by sale or exchange
in the tax year to get capital gain or loss treatment. This seems
to be the rationale of the Switlik holding. But is this the correct
construction of this language?
§ 117(a) is entitled "definitions." This refers to classifica-
tion, not realization. It defines capital gains and losses as those
"from the sale or exchange of a capital asset."
"From" is the key word in construing this provision. Web-
ster's International Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed., gives the
primary meaning as "indicating a point of starting." It also
is used as "indicating the source or original, or that which does
or did include or contain." The statutory phrase therefore
means literally a gain or loss having its source or origin in the
sale or exchange of a capital asset, without any implication as to
time. There is no definition of "from" which would indicate
that this phrase means "by" or "by means of" a sale or ex-
change.
There is therefore nothing in § 117(a) which must be con-
strued as stating a rule of time and manner of realizing gain or
loss. Such gain or loss could just as well have its source or origin
in an earlier sale or exchange of a capital asset. The fact that
it was realized at a later time and in a different manner would
then not be material. However there is nothing here either to
prevent construing the statute as meaning that the gain or loss
must have its source in an immediate sale or exchange within the
tax year.
The concept of realization of gains or losses is primarily a
judicial concept based on the general statutory provisions, mak-
9I.R.C. § 117(a) (2), (3), (4), (5).
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ing no distinction between transactions in capital or ordinary as-
sets. The doctrine antedates the special provisions for capital
gains and losses." There is certainly no need to hold that
§ 117(a) governs time and manner of realization of capital gain
and loss, as the general rules govern them if § 117 (a) is given
the restricted construction suggested. In fact, such construction
simplifies the doctrine of realization, leaving it as a general prin-
ciple without an unnecessary exception applying to capital gains
and losses.
In addition to eliminating a tricky exception to the general
doctrine of realization, this construction comes closer to fitting
the idea of an inherent distinction between capital transactions
and ordinary transactions. The courts have never been able to
see any essential distinction between the nature of the original
sale or exchange and later payment of a contingent liability aris-
ing therefrom. They first held that the original transaction
should be reopened and the tax adjusted.' In others, holding
that the annual accounting concept as construed by the Supreme
Court prevented this, they assumed without question that the
gain or loss was still capital.' It seems quite arbitrary and a bit
unfair to the government to class such a loss as an ordinary loss,
or to the taxpayer to class such a gain as an ordinary gain. The
suggested construction avoids this as to quite a group of cases.
It might prevent another patchwork amendment to the code.
It is believed that this construction of § 117(a) does no vio-
lence to its language, fits in well with the general doctrine of
realization, and will work out more nearly in accord with the
idea of a basic distinction between capital transactions and others,
than does the Switlik interpretation. The Duveen Bros. con-
struction seems the best.
However such construction does not settle all problems. In
the Dobson type of situation, the recovery of damages for fraud
inducing the purchase could hardly be said to have its source in
a sale or exchange of capital assets by the taxpayer; even though,
in a broader sense, the purchase, later sale, and the recovery of
damages all concern the same stock and should be treated the
same. This arbitrary statutory definition of capital gain and
'°Going back at least to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
'Barker, 3 PTA 1180 (1926), Joseph A. Mudd, 14 BTA 1417 (1929),
O'Neal, 18 BTA 1036 (1930).
Subsequent to North American Oil case: T. H. Symington, Inc., 35 BTA
711 (1937) rev. by Board; Park & Tilford, 43 BTA 348, 381 (1941), rev.
by Board.
Subsequent to Switlik in Tax Court: Dictum in Wurtzbaugh, 13 T.C.
1059 (1949) 1 judge.
'Koppers Co., 3 T.C. 62 (1944) ; Edith K. Timken 6 T.C. 483 (1946).
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loss cannot be stretched to cover all capital transactions. There
is need for a statutory change to adopt a more fundamental def-
inition of capital gains and losses.
The Supreme Court: The Lewis case is the most recent of a
long line of Supreme Court cases stressing the annual tax year
concept.'0 It establishes the "claim of right" doctrine as the
pricipal test of when income is realized. While cited by one Dis-
trict Court as stressing a rigid and literal interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code,1' it does not appear to be stating any
new policy of statutory interpretation. The court has said be-
fore that it would take the ordinary meaning of the statutory
language in the absence of some evidence that Congress intended
something else.' However it does look to Congressional purpose
to explain ambiguities in such language,' or even to restrict the
ordinary literal meaning of statutory language.' It has frowned
on importing equitable considerations into matters fairly ex-
plicity covered by the code.'
In one case the Supreme Court used evidence of Congres-
sional intent derived from the statutes themselves in construing
"sales" in § 117(a) as including forced sales.' J. Stone in his
opinion said:
"Congress thus has given clear indication of a pur-
pose to offset capital assets by losses from the sale of like
property and upon the same percentage basis as that on
which gains are based."
However the Court is not going to distort or disregard statutory
language because of such general Congressional purpose.' The
Court has held that other types of realization do not meet the
test of "sale or exchange" in § 117(a) unless specific statutes
require such treatment.'
With the exception of the Dobson case,' already discussed,
which is of almost no value on this point, the Court has not had
directly before it the ambiguity in § 117(a) as to whether capital
gain or loss must be realized by sale or exchange (or statutory
"BEllis R. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
"Commercial Trust Co. v. U.S., 96 F. Supp. 718 (W.D.Pa., 1951) ; same
language in Sharon Herald v. Granger, 97 F. Supp. 302 (W.D.Pa., 1951).
"MeClain v. Com'r, 311 U.S. 527 (1941).
"Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941) ; Crane v. Com'r, 331 U.S. 1
(1947).
"Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
"Security Flour Mills v. Com'r, 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
"Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
9"Fairbanks v. U.S., 306 U.S. 436 (1939).
"Helvering v. Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941).
=Note 6, p. 3, supra.
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substitutes) in the current tax year, or may arise directly from
an earlier sale or exchange and be realized in the current tax
year in some other manner. Literal interpretation of this lan-
guage leads to one conclusion about as easily as to the other.
However the general purpose of Congress, as discussed in the
Hammel case, would be better carried out by the latter interpreta-
tion. At least a few more transactions which are essentially cap-
ital transactions would be so treated, and perhaps the necessity
of one more of the patchwork amendments eliminated.
The Crane case' is an illustration of the difficulties that can
arise for the lower courts when the Supreme Court neglects to
consider the completely illogical § 117 (a) test of capital gains
and losses. The case held that a mortgage on property was part
of the cost basis, and of the sale price received, though personal
liability had not been assumed. J. Vinson carefully considered the
basis problem under § 113 (a) (5) and construed the word" prop-
erty" therein to mean the taxpayer's interest in property un-
reduced by liens thereon including those as to which no personal
liability had been assumed. To avoid an absurd result, it was
then decided that "property" sold would have to be defined in
the same way, and the "amount realized" under § 111(b) would
be the amount actually realized plus liens on the property. But
no consideration was given to the theory on which the court held
that the amount of the mortgage was gain from a "sale or ex-
change" under § 117 (a) entitled to capital gain treatment. There
is some vague talk to the effect that the seller "realizes a benefit
in the amount of the mortgage as well as the boot" under the
"amount realized" terminology of § 111(b). But why is this
capital gain? There was a sale here of T's equity in the property,
but he did not sell the mortgage obligation. He received no re-
lease of personal obligation as an exchange. It seems to be
stretching the "gain from sale or exchange" language quite a
bit to make it a technical formality with such a sale of T's equity
creating a gain of the amount of the unassumed mortgage as a
taxable gain from such sale. The Crane case theory also indicates
that a surrender of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee
might realize taxable gain or loss, though T did not given get a
release of obligation in return. The Lutz & Schramm case in
the Tax Court so held." But it also held without much considera-
tion that the gain was capital gain. Where is the "exchange"
entitling this to capital treatment? The only thing T received in
exchange for his surrender of the property would have to be the
=Crane v. Com'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
"Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Com'r, 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 14 [1953], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol14/iss1/4
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
purely fictitious benefit he was supposed to have received from
turning over the unassumed mortgage to someone else. It is to
be doubted if the Supreme Court would go so far with its fiction.
Previous cases say there is no exchange unless T receives a re-
lease of personal obligation in return for his surrender.'
The Crane case attempted a broad approach, looking to the
purpose of Congress and the effect of the proposed construction,
as a basis for statutory construction. Where it fell down was
in overlooking the necessity of coordinating another pertinent
section, § 117(a). The approach of J. Burton in the recent
Jacobson case' is a complete contrast in method. He was con-
cerned primarily with the question of whether cancellation of in-
debtedness in the case was income. He made a very technical
argument from § 22(b) (9) and § 113(b) (3) permitting cor-
porations to file a consent to reduce basis by the amount of debt
reductions instead of reporting them as income, sayinug that this
specific provision as to corporations implied that individuals
could not do the same thing--overlooking authority (conflicting)
that they can do this without statutory authority.' He argues
from this that the individual is required to report such gains
under § 22(a). This is the technical, legalistic approach used
in the most myoptic fashion. The Crane case approach was a bit
too broad, causing it to overlook the effect of one very pertinent
provision of the code. J. Burton's approach is entirely too nar-
row.
J. Burton's dictum in the Jacobson case throws a shadow of
doubt on those cases holding that cancellation of indebtedness in-
curred in purchasing assets may be used to reduce the basis of
such assets instead of reporting it as income. It also throws a
touch of doubt on a related group of cases holding that where
'Wm. H. Jamison, 8 T.C. 173 (1947) ; Commonwealth, Inc.. 36 BTA 850
(1937) Com'r v. Hoffman, 117 F(2d) 987, 41-1 USTC #9280 (2nd Cir.,
1941); Stokes v. Com'r, 124 F(2d) 335, 41-2 USTC #9770 (3rd Cir.,
1941); Polin v. Com'r, 114 F(2d) 174, 40-2 USTC #9639 (3rd Cir.,
(1940); cf. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F(2d) 455, 51-1 USTC #9112 (1st
Cir., 1951), abandonment.
"Com'r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
1940). Cf. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F(2d) 455, 51-1 USTC #9112 (1st
'Hirsch v. Com'r, 115 F(2d) 656, 40-2 USTC #9791 (7th Cir., 1940) ;
Helvering v. A. L. Kilian Co., 128 F(2d) 433, 42-2 USTC #9487 (8th
Cir., 1942) ; Edgar J. Kaufman, 10 TCM 790, (1951). Contra: Fifth
Avenue-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Com'r, 147 F(2d) 453, 45-1 USTC #9115
(2nd Cir., 1944). Cf. Denman Tire and Rubber Co. v. Com'r, 14 T.C. 706
(1950).
Inasmuch as § 22(b) (9) gives corporations a broader power than in-
dividuals were held to have, an inference that the individual right is
negatived is not justified: Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 475-80 (1940).
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a contingent obligation is incurred in the purchase of property,
payment of it is part of the cost of the property purchased and
should be added to basis.' Whether this adjustment of basis rule
will be used where T got capital assets on a liquidation or ex-
change in which he.realized capital gain or loss is a matter of
some doubt not settled by the cases.' The existing cases con-
cern purchases or tax-free exchanges and make no point of such
a distinction. The rule could be applied or a distinction made,
and it is hard to guess which way the courts may go.
The cases allowing adjustment of basis seem to assume that
this merely defers realization, with no consideration of whether
it may also change the classification of that realization. The
erratic nature of the statutory rules as to classification make it
hard to estimate what the effect of deferment of realization may
be.
It would seem that the courts should not consider one aspect
of the capital gain or loss problem without considering all angles.
But the arbitrary nature of the classification provisions of the
code make this exceedingly hard to do, and make complete con-
sistency impossible.
The recent Benedict case' was relied on by the Commissioner
in his appeal in the Switlik case,' in an argument that the tax-
payer should not be permitted to deduct a full loss when only
fifty per cent of the original gain was charged to him. The Bene-
dict case concerned a trust in which a charity had a right to a
percentage share of the trust income. The court held that only
50% of the charity's share of long term capital gain income could
be deducted as a charitable contribution, since only 50% was re-
ported as income. This was a trust in which the charity had an
immediate equitable right to a specific share in the income of
the trust corpus. If an individual were substituted for the trust,
it is hard to see how such a result could be supported. The ma-
jority opinion by J. Burton is completely baffling if you overlook
the second half of footnote 10 which is the key to the whole thing.
The Third Circuit in the Switlik case distinguished Benedict be-
2Portland Gas Co. v. Com'r, 181 F(2d) 538, 50-1 USTC #9263 (5th Cir.,
1950); W. D. Haden Co. v. Com'r, 165 F(2d) 588, 48-1 USTC #9147
(5th Cir., 1948) ; Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Com'r, 153 F(2d) 323, 46-1
USTC #9193 (8th Cir., 1946) ; Brown Fence & Wire Co., 46 BTA 344
(1942) ; Bermont Oil Co. v. Helvering, 91 F(2d) 710, 37-1 USTC # 9298
(C.A., D.C., 1937) ; Watab Paper Co., 27 BTA 488 (1932), app. dis. 68
F(2d) 998 (8th Cir., 1933) ; Meeks Motor Fr. Co., 8 TCM 838 (1949).
'No cases have been found where there was such prior realization.
'Note 5, p. 2, supra.
uNote 1, p. 1, supra.
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cause it concerned only a single tax year, but this is not the
principal reason why it has no bearing on our problem.
Conclusin : It is our conclusion that the preferable con-
struction of the definitions of capital gains and losses in § 117 (a)
is gains or losses having their source or origin in a sale or ex-
change of capital assets. These capital gains or losses can arise
from earlier sales or exchanges, and can be realized in a later
year by a different type of realization. Contingent rights or lia-
bilities can arise out of a sale or exchange (or statutory substitute
therefor, such as a liquidation of a corporation), and the amounts
recovered or paid in a later year will still be capital items under
such interpretation.
§ 117(a) need not be construed as requiring that a capital
gain or loss be realized directly by sale or exchange, though that
is a possible interpretation. This section does not purport to con-
cern the time and manner of realizing capital gains and losses.
Gains and losses on capital assets are realized in the same manner
as those on other assets, under general principles of realization.
The proposed construction comes closest to being a literal
interpretation of the statute. It has the advantage of treating
both realizations of gain or loss respecting the same asset in the
same manner, preventing juggling or unfairness. It appears to
accord with the general purpose of Congress, and may avoid an-
other amendment to the code.
This construction still leaves a problem of whether the im-
mediate realization has enough connection with an earlier sale or
exchange (or statutory substitute) to be said to have its source or
origin in it. Contingent rights or liabilities expressly agreed to
on the earlier sale or exchange would meet the test. Transferee
liability arising as a matter of law from a sale, exchange or
liquidation would also have sufficient connection. Such transac-
tions as the Dobson case was concerned with would not seem to
meet the test because the right did not arise from the sale causing
the earlier loss, but from the still earlier purchase. Many essen-
tially capital transactions would still be excluded from capital
gain and loss treatment.
The whole problem illustrates the need for a simple, basic
rule for classifying capital gains and losses. Even the Tax Court
judges, familiar as they are with the code, occasionally fall into
the trap for the unwary, § 117(a), and assume that if you have
capital assets and a realization, it follow that you have capital
11
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gain or loss. That probably should be the test,' which incidental-
ly might have the desirable effect of causing some of the anom-
alies of § 117(j) to be eliminated in the course of amending the
section. There should be little trouble in determining when as-
sets change from one classification to another, as considerable law
already exists on this point. A rule would have to be developed
as to when contingent rights and liabilities having some connec-
tion with an earlier capital transaction should receive the same
classification and when they should not. Such a test would seem
to be simple and understandable so that ordinary lawyers not
specializing in taxation might be able to figure it out.
nThis Is the approach in the American Law Institute's tentative draft of
their proposed recodification of the Federal Income Tax Law, see
§ X225 et seq.
May It Please the People
In the recent years of rising costs generally,
it would be remarkable if some industry of-
fered a better bargain now than a few dec-
ades ago, wouldn't it ? That's exactly what
we have done. Today you pay only a fraction
of what you did years ago for a kilowatt-
hour of electric energy.
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT MAKES AMERICA GREAT
The Montana Power Company
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